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Abstract
This paper considers the covert identification problem in which a sender aims to reliably convey an identification (ID) message
to a set of receivers via a binary-input memoryless channel (BMC), and simultaneously to guarantee that the communication is
covert with respect to a warden who monitors the communication via another independent BMC. We prove a square-root law for
the covert identification problem. This states that an ID message of size exp(exp(Θ(
√
n))) can be transmitted over n channel uses.
We then characterize the exact pre-constant in the Θ(·) notation. This constant is referred to as the covert identification capacity.
We show that it equals the recently developed covert capacity in the standard covert communication problem, and somewhat
surprisingly, the covert identification capacity can be achieved without any shared key between the sender and receivers. The
achievability proof relies on a random coding argument with pulse-position modulation (PPM), coupled with a second stage which
performs code refinements. The converse proof relies on an expurgation argument as well as results for channel resolvability with
stringent input constraints.
Index Terms
Covert Communication, Identification via channels, Channel resolvability.
I. INTRODUCTION
In contrast to Shannon’s classical channel coding problem [1] (also known as the transmission problem) in which a sender
wishes to reliably send a message to a receiver through a noisy channel W , the problem of identification via channels [2]
(or simply the identification problem) is rather different. It focuses on a different setting wherein a sender wishes to send an
identification (ID) message m ∈ M via a noisy channel W to a set of receivers {Rm′}m′∈M, each observing the (same)
outputs of the channel, such that every receiver Rm′ only cares about its dedicated message m
′ and should be able to reliably
answer the following question: Is the ID message sent by the sender m′? Specifically, if the ID message sent by the sender is
m,
• The receiver Rm′ should answer “YES” with high probability if m′ = m;
• The receiver Rm′ should answer “NO” with high probability if m′ 6= m.
It is well known that in the transmission problem, one can reliably transmit a message of size exp(Θ(n)) over n channel uses,
and the pre-constant is characterized by the celebrated channel capacity CW , maxP I(P,W ), i.e., the mutual information
of the input and output of the channel W maximized over the input distribution P . In the identification problem, Ahlswede
and Dueck [2] showed that the size of the ID message can be as large as exp(exp(Θ(n))), i.e., doubly-exponentially large in
the blocklength n. Somewhat surprisingly, the exact pre-constant in the Θ(·) notation, which is referred to as the identification
capacity, is again CW [2], [3]. That is, the identification capacity exactly equals the channel capacity.
Apart from reliability guarantees, recent years have witnessed an increasing attention to security concerns, especially in
networked communication systems such as the Internet of Things. From an information-theoretic perspective, the security of
the classical transmission problem has been extensively studied since Wyner’s seminal paper [4] on the wiretap channel (see [5],
[6] for surveys), and the secure identification problem has been investigated as well [7]–[9]. While most security problems are
concerned with hiding the content of information, in certain scenarios merely the fact that communication takes place could
lead to serious consequences—thus, the sender is required to hide the fact that he/she is communicating when he/she does so.
Said differently, the sender needs to communicate covertly with respect to the warden who is surreptitiously monitoring the
communication. This motivates the recent studies of the covert communication problem. Following the pioneering work by
Bash et al. [10] which demonstrates a square-root law (SRL) (i.e., one can only transmit Θ(
√
n) bits over n channel uses) for
covert communication, subsequent works have built on the initial work [10] to establish information-theoretic limits for covert
communication over binary symmetric channels [11]–[13], discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) and Gaussian channels [14]–
[17], multiple-access channels [18], broadcast channels [19]–[21], compound channels [22], channel with states [23], [24],
adversarial noise channels [25], relay channels [26], etc. In the literature, the covertness constraint requires that at the warden’s
side, the output distribution when communication takes place is almost indistinguishable from the output distribution when no
communication takes place, and the discrepancy between the two distributions is usually measured by the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence or the variational distance.
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2In addition to covert communication which focuses on the transmission problem, there are also scenarios in which the sender
wishes to reliably send an ID message to a set of receivers, and simultaneously to remain covert with respect to the warden.
For instance, a commander would like to send a certain message to a set of subordinates M. This message informs exactly
one of them to be prepared to strike. Each of these subordinates m′ ∈ M would like to know whether the message sent by
the commander m ∈M corresponds to his specific index m′; if so, he must be prepared, otherwise nothing needs to be done
on his part. Each subordinate is only interested in whether or not he should be ready. The commander has to send his message
in such a way that an enemy should not be able to infer that any communication is occurring. We refer to this problem as
the covert identification problem. Given the similarities and differences between the transmission and identification problems
without covertness constraints, it is then natural to ask the following questions: (i) What is the maximum size of the ID message
with covertness constraints, (ii) Whether the covert capacity characterized in [14], [15] plays a role in the fundamental limits
of the covert identification problem, and (iii) Is a shared key required to ensure that the identification can take place reliably?
These questions precisely set the stage of this work, and our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
• Analogous to the SRL in the covert communication literature, a different form of the SRL is discovered in the covert
identification problem. That is, one can send an ID message of size up to exp(exp(Θ(
√
n))) reliably and covertly, in
contrast to the standard identification problem wherein the scaling is exp(exp(Θ(n))).
• We then characterize the maximal pre-constant of the Θ(·) notation in exp(exp(Θ(√n))), which is referred to as the
covert identification capacity. We do so by establishing matching achievability and converse results. It turns out that the
covert identification capacity equals the covert capacity; however, a key difference is that the former is achieved without
any shared key between the sender and receivers—this is in stark contrast to standard covert communication wherein the
shared key is necessary [14] for achieving covert capacity in some regimes of the channel between the sender and receiver
and the channel between the sender and the warden.
From the achievability’s perspective, the requirement of a keyless identification code prevents us from adopting the simplest
and most classical construction of identification codes proposed by Ahlswede and Dueck [2], which relies on the existence
of a capacity-achieving code for the transmission problem. This is because there does not exist a keyless covert-capacity-
achieving transmission code for covert communication in general [14]. Therefore, we develop an identification code from first
principles. Our construction is based on a random coding argument with Pulse-Position Modulation (PPM) and a modified
information density decoder. PPM, which can be viewed as a special sub-class of constant composition codes, was shown
to be optimal for covert communication by Bloch and Guha [27]. PPM codes are also useful in this work. In addition, we
highlight that the random coding argument does not directly ensure the existence of a good identification code with vanishing
maximum error probabilities, due to the large message size which is of order exp(exp(Θ(
√
n))); this issue is resolved by
a careful code refinement process, which is explained in Section IV-D. Our code refinement process is different from the
conventional expurgation argument that is ubiquitous in the information theory literature, in the sense that our refinement
procedure preserves the channel output distribution induced by the original code; this is critical for ensuring that the covertness
constraint is satisfied.
The proof of the converse part for the covert identification problem is also non-standard. Roughly speaking, the converse for
channel identification usually relies on the achievability for channel resolvability for general input distributions, as discovered
in Han and Verdú’s seminal work [3]. However, such general results have not been established under stringent input constraints
imposed by the covertness constraint. Instead, we circumvent this difficulty by expurgating a large number of codevectors of
the original covert identification code such that the resultant expurgated code satisfies certain cost constraints, and one can
then apply the idea of [3] to the new code to obtain the desired converse result. It is also worth noting that the expurgation
argument used in this work differs from some relevant works on covert communication [16], [25], [28], since the identification
problem relies critically on the use of stochastic encoders (as detailed in Section III).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We provide some notational conventions and an important technical lemma in
Section II. In Section III, we formally introduce the covert identification problem and also present the main results. Sections IV
and V respectively provide the detailed proofs of the achievability and converse parts for the main results. In Section VI, we
conclude this work and propose several promising directions for future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For non-negative integers a, b ∈ N, we use [a : b] to denote the set of integers {a, a+1, . . . , b}. Random variables and their
realizations are respectively denoted by uppercase and lowercase letters, e.g., X and x. Sets are denoted by calligraphic letters,
e.g., X . Vectors of length n are denoted by boldface letters, e.g., X or x, while vectors of shorter length (which should be
clear from the context) are denoted by underlined boldface letters, e.g., X or x. We use Xi or xi to denote the i-th element
of a vector, and Xba or x
b
a to denote the vector (Xa, Xa+1, . . . , Xb) or (xa, xa+1, . . . , xb).
3Throughout this paper, logarithms log and exponentials exp are based e. For two probability distributions P and Q over the
same finite set X , we respectively define their KL-divergence, variational distance, and χ2-distance as
D(P‖Q) ,
∑
x∈X
P (x) log
P (x)
Q(x)
,
V(P,Q) ,
1
2
∑
x∈X
|P (x) −Q(x)|,
χ2(P‖Q) ,
∑
x∈X
(P (x) −Q(x))2
Q(x)
.
We say P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q (denoted by P ≪ Q) if the support of P is a subset of the support of
Q (i.e., for all x ∈ X , P (x) = 0 if Q(x) = 0).
Moreover, we introduce a concentration inequality that is widely used in this work—Hoeffding’s inequality.
Lemma 1 (Hoeffding’s inequality [29]). Suppose {Xi}ni=1 is a set of independent random variables such that ai ≤ Xi ≤ bi
almost surely, and let X ,
∑n
i=1Xi. For any v > 0,
P (|X − E(X)| ≥ v) ≤ exp
(
− 2v
2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
.
III. PROBLEM SETTING AND MAIN RESULTS
The channel between the sender and receivers is a binary-input memoryless channel (BMC) (X ,WY |X ,Y), and the channel
between the sender and warden is another independent BMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z). It is assumed that Y and Z are finite alphabets, and
X = {0, 1} with ‘0’ being the innocent symbol and ‘1’ being the symbol that carries information.1 The channel transition prob-
ability corresponding to n channel uses are denoted by W⊗nY |X(y|x) ,
∏n
i=1WY |X(yi|xi) and W⊗nZ|X(z|x) ,
∏n
i=1WZ|X(zi|xi).
Moreover, we define
P0 , WY |X=0, P1 , WY |X=1,
Q0 , WZ|X=0, Q1 , WZ|X=1.
As is common in the covert communication literature, it is assumed that (i) Q0 6= Q1, (ii) Q1 is absolutely continuous
with respect to Q0 (i.e., Q1 ≪ Q0), and (iii) P1 is absolutely continuous with respect to P0 (i.e., P1 ≪ P0). The first
two assumptions preclude the scenarios in which covertness is always guaranteed or would never be guaranteed, while the
last assumption precludes the possibility that the receivers enjoy an unfair advantage over the warden (as detailed in [14,
Appendix G]). Let µ0 , minz:Q0(z)>0Q0(z), µ1 , minz:Q1(z)>0Q1(z), and µ˜ , min{µ0, µ1}
Definition 1 (Identification codes). An identification code C with message set M is a collection of codewords {Um}m∈M and
decoding regions {Dm}m∈M, where Um ∈ P(Xn) and Dm ⊆ Yn.
Remark 1. In contrast to most communication problems wherein each message m is deterministically mapped to a fixed
sequence (the codeword) x ∈ Xn, the identification problem uses stochastic encoders such that message m is stochastically
mapped to a random sequence X according to the probability distribution Um ∈ P(Xn). Moreover, the decoding regions
{Dm}m∈M in the identification problem are not necessarily disjoint. The use of stochastic encoders and the fact that the
decoding regions are not disjoint are critical for communicating ω(n) bits of message over n channel uses. With a slight abuse
of terminology, we refer to the distribution Um as the codeword for the message m.
The tranmission status of the sender is denoted by T ∈ {0, 1}. Communication takes place if T = 1, while no communication
takes place if T = 0. When T = 1, the sender selects a message m uniformly at random from M. The encoder then chooses
a length-n sequence X ∈ Xn according to the distribution Um. When T = 0, the channel input is the length-n zero sequence
0. For the receiver Rm′ (m
′ ∈ M), upon receiving the channel output Y ∈ Yn through the BMC W⊗nY |X , it declares that the
message sent by the sender is m′ if and only if Y ∈ Dm′ .
The standard identification problem usually focuses on two types of error—the error probability of the first kind which
corresponds to the probability that the true message is not identified by its designated receiver, and the error probability of
the second kind which corresponds to the probability that the message is wrongly identified by some other receiver. For the
covert identification problem, we introduce one more type of error—the error probability of the third kind which corresponds
to the probability that the length-n zero sequence 0 (when no communication takes place) is wrongly identified as a certain
message by any receiver. We formalize these notions in the following definition.
1It is also possible to consider a more general setting with multiple non-zero input symbols (by following the lead of [15]); however, for simplicity and
ease of presentation, we focus on the binary-input setting in this work.
4Definition 2 (Error probabilities). When T = 1 and m ∈ M is sent, the error probability of the first kind is defined as
P (1)err (m) ,
∑
x∈Xn
Um(x)W
⊗n
Y |X(Dcm|x).
When T = 1 and m′ ∈ M is sent, the error probability of the second kind corresponding to the receiver Rm is defined as
P (2)err (m,m
′) ,
∑
x∈Xn
Um′(x)W
⊗n
Y |X(Dm|x).
When T = 0 and the length-n zero sequence is sent through the channel, the error probability of the third kind corresponding
to the receiver Rm is defined as
P (3)err (m) , P
⊗n
0 (Dm).
Furthermore, let the corresponding maximum error probabilities (over all the messages or all pairs of distinct messages) be
P (1)err , max
m∈M
P (1)err (m),
P (2)err , max
(m,m′)∈M2:m 6=m′
P (2)err (m,m
′),
P (3)err , max
m∈M
P (3)err (m)
Let Q̂nC(z) be the output distribution on Zn for the warden induced by the identification code, which takes the form
Q̂nC(z) ,
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
x∈Xn
Um(x)W
⊗n
Z|X (z|x), ∀z ∈ Zn. (1)
We adopt the widely-used KL-divergence metric D(Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0 ) to measure covertness with respect to the warden.
Definition 3 (Covertness). The communication is δ-covert if the KL-divergence between the distribution Q̂nC (when T = 1)
and Q⊗n0 (when T = 0) is bounded from above by δ, i.e.,
D(Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0 ) ≤ δ.
Let π1|0 and π0|1 respectively be the probabilities of false alarm (i.e., making an error when T = 0) and missed detection
(i.e., making an error when T = 1) of the warden’s hypothesis test. By using the definition of the variational distance and
Pinsker’s inequality, we see that the optimal test satisfies
π1|0 + π0|1 = 1− V(Q̂nC , Q⊗n0 ) ≥ 1−
√
D(Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0 ).
Thus, a small D(Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0 ) implies a large sum-error π1|0+π0|1. This provides an operational meaning of the covertness metric
in Definition 3. As discussed in prior works such as [15], [16], [30], the variational distance metric V(Q̂nC , Q
⊗n
0 ) is perhaps a
better metric under the specific assumption that T = 0 and T = 1 occur with equal probabilities, since it directly connects to
the average error probability of detection; however, the above assumption does not hold in general, thus both KL-divergence
and variational distance are deemed to be appropriate metrics in the literature.
Definition 4. A rate R is said to be δ-achievable if there exists a sequence of identification codes with increasing blocklength
n such that
lim inf
n→∞
log log |M|√
n
≥ R, D
(
Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0
)
≤ δ,
lim
n→∞
P (1)err = lim
n→∞
P (2)err = lim
n→∞
P (3)err = 0.
The δ-covert identification capacity Cδ is defined as the supremum of all δ-achievable rates.
Note that the coding rate R in the covert identification problem is defined as the iterated logarithm of the size of the message
set |M| normalized by √n, which implies that the message size (if R > 0) is of order exp(exp(Θ(√n))). This intuitively
makes sense because the channel identification problem usually allows the message size to be as large as exp(exp(Θ(n))), but
the stringent covertness constraint reduces the exponent from Θ(n) to Θ(
√
n). In the following, we present the main result
that characterizes the δ-covert identification capacity of BMCs.
5Main result: The covert identification capacity
Theorem 1. For any BMCs WY |X and WZ|X satisfying Q1 6= Q0, Q1 ≪ Q0, and P1 ≪ P0, the δ-covert identification capacity
is given by
Cδ =
√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0)D(P1‖P0).
Some remarks are in order.
1) Analogous to the canonical covert communication problem, we notice that the SRL also holds for the covert identification
problem albeit with message size exp(exp(Θ(
√
n))). Furthermore, the δ-covert identification capacity is exactly the same
as the δ-covert capacity derived in [14], [15].
2) In stark contrast to the standard covert communication problem [14] in which a shared key is needed to achieve the covert
capacity when the channels WY |X and WZ|X satisfy D(P1‖P0) ≤ D(Q1‖Q0), Theorem 1 above shows that regardless
of the values of D(P1‖P0) and D(Q1‖Q0), the δ-covert identification capacity is always achievable without any shared
key. Intuitively, this is because the message size in our setting scales as exp(ω(n)), which automatically allows us to
satisfy the requirements on the shared key via proof techniques from channel resolvability [31] since it is well known
that an exponential message size (of a suitably large exponent) suffices to drive the approximation error (of the target and
synthesized distributions) to zero. This is reflected in Lemma 5 in our achievability proof.
We prove the achievability part of Theorem 1 in Section IV, and the converse part in Section V.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY
The achievability proof is partitioned into two stages. In the first stage, we use a random coding argument with a PPM
input distribution and a modified information density decoder to show the existence of a “weak” covert identification code.
By “weak” we mean that this stage only guarantees that the average (rather than maximum) error probability of the third
kind vanishes. In the second stage, we apply a code refinement process to the “weak” covert identification code, such that the
refined code satisfies all the criteria for the three error probabilities and covertness in Definition 4.
We first provide a detailed introduction of PPM in Subsection IV-A. The first stage of the achievability is described in
Subsection IV-B and proved in Subsection IV-C, while the second stage is presented in Subsection IV-D.
A. Pulse Position Modulation (PPM)
Let
l ,
⌊√
(2δ − n−1/3)n
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
⌋
be the weight parameter, and (w, s) be non-negative integers such that w , ⌊n/l⌋ and s , n − wl. We use x ∈ Xw,y ∈
Yw, z ∈ Zw to denote vectors of length w. We also let wtH(x) denote the number of ones, or the weight, of the vector x. Let
PwX (x) ,
{
1/w, if wtH(x) = 1,
0, otherwise,
be the distribution on Xw such that PwX (x) is non-zero if and only if x has Hamming weight one. The corresponding output
distributions PwY and P
w
Z are respectively given by
PwY(y) ,
∑
x∈Xw
PwX(x)W
⊗w
Y |X (y|x), and (2)
PwZ (z) ,
∑
x∈Xw
PwX (x)W
⊗w
Y |X (z|x). (3)
For each i ∈ [1 : l], we define the length-w vector x(i) , xiw(i−1)w+1. Thus, every length-n vector x can be represented as
x = [x(1), . . . ,x(l), xnwl+1], where x
n
wl+1 is of length s. The PPM input distribution is thus defined as
Pn,lX (x) ,
l∏
i=1
PwX (x
(i)) · 1{wtH(xnwl+1) = 0} .
That is, we require each PPM-generated vector, also called a PPM-sequence, x to contain exactly l ones; in particular, each
of the first l intervals [1 : w], [w + 1 : 2w], . . . , [(l − 1)w + 1 : lw] contains a single one, and the last interval [wl + 1 : n]
contains all zeros.
6B. Existence of a “weak” covert identification code
1) Encoder and Decoder: Let η ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary, the normalized weight parameter t , l/√n, r = (1− η)tD(P1‖P0),
and r′ = (1 − (η/2))tD(P1‖P0). The size of the message set |M| = exp(er
√
n). For each message m ∈ M, we generate
N , er
′√n sequences {xm,i}Ni=1 independently according to Pn,lX , and the codeword Um is the uniform distribution over the
set {xm,i}Ni=1, i.e.,
Um(x) ,
1
N
N∑
i=1
1 {x = xm,i} , ∀x ∈ Xn.
That is, we send each of the sequences {xm,i}Ni=1 with equal probability when m is the true message.
Let γ , (1 − ǫ)tD(P1‖P0), where 0 < ǫ < η/2. To specify the decoding region Dm for each message m ∈ M, we first
define the set Fx for each x ∈ Xn as
Fx ,
{
y ∈ Yn : log
W⊗nY |X(y|x)
P⊗0 (y)
> γ
√
n
}
.
The decoding region for each m is Dm , ∪i∈[1:N ]Fxm,i .
2) Error probabilities and distributions of interest: Based on the encoding scheme described above, the error probabilities
of the first and second kinds can be rewritten as
P (1)err (m) =
∑
x∈Xn
1
N
N∑
i=1
1 {x = xm,i}W⊗nY |X(Dcm|x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Dcm|xm,i), and (4)
P (2)err (m,m
′) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Dm|xm′,i). (5)
Consider the PPM distribution Pn,lX on Xn, the corresponding output distributions Pn,lY on Yn and Pn,lZ on Zn are respectively
given by
Pn,lY (y) ,
∑
x∈Xn
Pn,lX (x)W
⊗n
Y |X(y|x)
=
∑
x∈Xn
l∏
i=1
PwX(x
(i))1
{
wtH(x
n
wl+1) = 0
}
W⊗nY |X(y|x)
=
(
l∏
i=1
PwY (y
(i))
)
· P⊗s0 (ynwl+1), and (6)
Pn,lY (z) ,
∑
x∈Xn
Pn,lX (x)W
⊗n
Z|X(z|x) =
(
l∏
i=1
PwZ (z
(i))
)
·Q⊗s0 (znwl+1),
where (6) follows from (2). Given the sequences {xm,i}Ni=1 for each m ∈M, we can also rewrite the output distribution Q̂nC
on Zn, which is first defined in (1), as
Q̂nC(z) =
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nZ|X(z|xm,i).
3) Performance guarantees: Lemma 2 below shows that with high probability, the randomly generated identification code
is a “weak” covert identification code, in the sense that it only has a vanishing average (and not maximum) error probability
of the third kind.
Lemma 2. There exist vanishing sequences κn, ε
(1)
n , ε
(2)
n , ε
(3)
n > 0 (depending on the channels WY |X ,WZ|X and the covertness
parameter δ) such that with probability at least 1−κn over the code generation process, the randomly generated code satisfies
max
m∈M
P (1)err (m) ≤ ε(1)n , max
(m,m′)∈M2:m 6=m′
P (2)err (m,m
′) ≤ ε(2)n ,
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
P (3)err (m) ≤ ε(3)n , D
(
Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0
)
≤ δ.
7C. Proof of Lemma 2
1) Analysis of P
(1)
err : Consider a fixed message m ∈ M. By recalling Eqn. (4) and noting that Dcm ⊆ Fcxm,i , we have
P (1)err (m) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Dcm|xm,i) ≤
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Fcxm,i |xm,i). (7)
Note that each xm,i is generated according to P
n,l
X , and
EPn,l
X
(
W⊗nY |X(FcX|X)
)
=
∑
x
Pn,lX (x)
∑
y
W⊗nY |X(y|x)1
{
log
W⊗nY |X(y|x)
P⊗0 (y)
≤ γ√n
}
=
∑
x
Pn,lX (x)
∑
y
W⊗nY |X(y|x)1

n∑
j=1
log
WY |X(yj |xj)
P0(yj)
≤ γ√n

=
∑
x
Pn,lX (x)
∑
y
W⊗nY |X(y|x)1
 ∑
j:xj=1
log
P1(yj)
P0(yj)
≤ γ√n
 , (8)
where (8) holds since log
WY |X (yj|xj)
P0(yj)
= log
P0(yj)
P0(yj)
= 0 for all j such that xj = 0. Without loss of generality, we define
x∗ ∈ Xn as the weight-l vector such that x∗(j−1)w+1 = 1 for j ∈ [1 : l], thus (8) also equals∑
y
W⊗nY |X(y|x∗)1

l∑
j=1
log
P1(y(j−1)w+1)
P0(y(j−1)w+1)
≤ γ√n
 = PP⊗l1
 l∑
j=1
log
P1(Y(j−1)w+1)
P0(Y(j−1)w+1)
≤ γ√n
 .
Note that the random variables {log P1(Y(j−1)w+1)P0(Y(j−1)w+1)}j∈[1:l] are independent and bounded,E(
∑l
j=1 log
P1(Y(j−1)w+1)
P0(Y(j−1)w+1)
) = lD(P1‖P0),
and γ
√
n , (1 − ǫ)lD(P1‖P0). By applying Hoeffding’s inequality (Lemma 1), we have
PP⊗l1
 l∑
j=1
log
P1(Y(j−1)w+1)
P0(Y(j−1)w+1)
≤ γ√n
 ≤ 2e−c1√n, (9)
for some constant c1 > 0.
Let µ be a constant satisfying 0 < µ < min{r′ − r, γ − r′}, βn , 2e−c1
√
n, and αn , max{2βn, e−µ
√
n/2}. Consider
the N independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables {W⊗nY |X(FcXm,i |Xm,i)}i∈[1:N ] which correspond to the
right-hand side (RHS) of (7). Note that each random variable belongs to [0, 1], and the expectation is at most βn according
to (9). By applying Hoeffding’s inequality again and noting that αn − βn ≥ e−µ
√
n/2/2, we have
P
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(FcXm,i |Xm,i) ≥ αn
)
≤ exp{−2N(αn − βn)2} ≤ exp{−1
2
e(r
′−µ)√n
}
.
Therefore, a union bound over all the messages m ∈ M yields
P
(
max
m∈M
P (1)err ≥ αn
)
= P
(
∃m ∈ M : 1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Dcm|Xm,i) ≥ αn
)
≤
∑
m∈M
P
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(FXm,i |Xm,i) ≥ αn
)
= exp
{
−1
2
e(r
′−µ)√n + er
√
n
}
,
which vanishes since the choice of µ ensures r′ − µ > r.
2) Analysis of P
(2)
err : Consider a fixed message pair (m,m′) ∈M2. Recall from Eqn. (5) that
P (2)err (m,m
′) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Dm|xm′,i). (10)
Suppose the set of PPM-sequences {xm,j}j∈[1:N ] (i.e., Pn,lX (xm,j) 6= 0) for message m is fixed, thus the decoding region Dm
is also fixed. Since Dm = ∪j∈[1:N ]Fxm,j , we have
EPn,l
X
(
W⊗nY |X(Dm|X)
)
≤
N∑
j=1
EPn,l
X
(
W⊗nY |X(Fxm,j |X)
)
. (11)
8Lemma 3. Let ξ ,
∑
y∈Y
P1(y)
2
P0(y)
. For any PPM-sequence x˜ ∈ Xn, we have
EPn,l
X
(
W⊗nY |X(Fx˜|X)
)
≤ exp{−γ√n+ l(ξ − 1)/w} . (12)
Proof of Lemma 3. For any PPM-sequence x˜ ∈ Xn, we have
EPn,l
X
(
W⊗nY |X(Fx˜|X)
)
=
∑
x
Pn,lX (x)
∑
y
W⊗nY |X(y|x)1
{
log
W⊗nY |X(y|x˜)
P⊗n0 (y)
> γ
√
n
}
=
∑
y
Pn,lY (y)
P⊗n0 (y)
P⊗n0 (y)1
{
log
W⊗nY |X(y|x˜)
P⊗n0 (y)
> γ
√
n
}
≤ e−γ
√
n
∑
y
Pn,lY (y)
P⊗n0 (y)
W⊗nY |X(y|x˜) (13)
= e−γ
√
n
∑
y
(∏l
i=1 P
w
Y (y
(i))
)
· P⊗s0 (ynwl+1)
P⊗n0 (y)
W⊗nY |X(y|x˜) (14)
= e−γ
√
n
 l∏
i=1
∑
y(i)
PwY(y
(i))
P⊗w0 (y(i))
W⊗wY |X (y
(i)|x˜(i))
∑
yn
wl+1
P⊗s0 (y
n
wl+1)
P⊗s0 (y
n
wl+1)
P⊗s0 (y
n
wl+1)
 , (15)
where (13) holds since we only consider y that satisfies log
(
W⊗nY |X(y|x˜)/P⊗n0 (y)
)
> γ
√
n, and (14) follows from (6). Without
loss of generality, we consider the first interval [1 : w] such that y(1) = [y1, . . . , yw] and x˜
(1) = [x˜1, . . . , x˜w], and by symmetry
we further assume x˜1 = 1 and x˜j = 0 for j ∈ [2 : w]. Thus,
∑
y(1)
PwY(y
(1))
P⊗w0 (y(1))
W⊗wY |X (y
(1)|x˜(1)) =
∑
y(1)
PwY(y
(1))
P⊗w0 (y(1))
P1(y1) w∏
j=2
P0(yj)

=
∑
y1
(PwY)1(y1)
P0(y1)
P1(y1) (16)
=
∑
y1
1
wP1(y1) +
w−1
w P0(y1)
P0(y1)
P1(y1)
= 1 +
1
w
(ξ − 1), (17)
where (PwY )1 in (16) stands for the marginal distribution of P
w
Y which takes the form
1
wP1+
w−1
w P0. Combining (15) and (17)
and applying the inequality log(1 + x) ≤ x, we have
EPn,l
X
(
W⊗nY |X(Fx˜|X)
)
≤ e−γ
√
n
(
1 +
1
w
(ξ − 1)
)l
≤ e−γ
√
nel(ξ−1)/w,
which completes the proof.
Combining (11) and Lemma 3, we obtain that the expectation of the random variable W⊗nY |X(Dm|X) is bounded from above
as
EPn,l
X
(
W⊗nY |X(Dm|X)
)
≤ exp
{
−(γ − r′)√n+ l(ξ − 1)
w
}
, β′n, (18)
which vanishes since r′ < γ. Let α′n , max{2β′n, e−µ
√
n/2}, and note that α′n − β′n ≥ e−µ
√
n/2/2. Consider the N i.i.d.
random variables {W⊗nY |X(Dm|Xm′,i)}i∈[1:N ] which are present in the RHS of (10). Note that each random variable belongs
to [0, 1], and the expectation is at most β′n. By applying Hoeffding’s inequality, we have that for fixed Dm,
P{Xm′,i}
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Dm|Xm′,i) ≥ α′n
)
≤ exp{−2N(α′n − β′n)2} ≤ exp{−12e(r′−µ)√n
}
. (19)
9Note that (19) is true for any fixed Dm (or equivalently, any fixed {xm,j}j∈[1:N ]) that corresponds to message m. Next, we
also take the randomness of {Xm,j}j∈[1:N ] into consideration. Let Dm be the chance variable corresponding to Dm, and we
have
P{Xm,i},{Xm′,i}
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Dm|Xm′,i) ≥ α′n
)
=
∑
Dm
P{Xm,i}(Dm = Dm)P{Xm′,i}
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Dm|Xm′,i) ≥ α′n
)
(20)
≤ exp
{
−1
2
e(r
′−µ)√n
}
. (21)
Finally, a union bound over all the message pairs (m,m′) ∈M2 yields
P
(
max
(m,m′)∈M2:m 6=m′
P (2)err ≥ α′n
)
≤
∑
(m,m′)∈M2:m 6=m′
P
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Dm|Xm′,i) ≥ α′n
)
= exp
{
−1
2
e(r
′−µ)√n + 2er
√
n
}
,
which vanishes since the choice of µ ensures r′ − µ > r.
Remark 2. The analysis of P
(2)
err relies on the fact that every PPM-sequence has the same weight. Specifically, the crux of our
proof is to first bound the error term 1N
∑N
i=1 W
⊗n
Y |X(Dm|Xm′,i) with respect to a fixed realization Dm of the chance variable
Dm (or equivalently, a fixed realization {xm,j}Nj=1 for message m). Next, we take an expectation over Dm, as reflected
in (20). Using PPM ensures that for every realization {xm,j}Nj=1, each element xm,j is a weight-l PPM-sequence that satisfies
inequality (12) of Lemma 3. Following Lemma 3 and the analysis starting from (18), it is shown that for every realization Dm,
one can derive the same upper bound on the error probability as presented in (19); thus it becomes straightforward to take
an expectation over Dm to obtain (21) from (20). In contrast, if a coding scheme in which the weight of each xm,j is random
were used (which would be the case if each component of xm,j was generated in an i.i.d. manner), it would require more
effort to analyze the chance variable Dm since the upper bound on the error probability in (19) depends on each realization of
Dm. In fact, the proof technique to upper bound P (2)err is also applicable to any constant composition code, i.e., not restricted
to PPM codes. The reason why we adopt PPM is that it makes the proof of covertness easier, since, as shown in Lemma 4 to
follow, the PPM-induced output distribution Pn,lZ possess favorable covertness properties.
3) Analysis of P
(3)
err : For a fixed message m ∈ M, the error probability of the third kind is bounded from above as
P (3)err (m) = P
⊗n
0 (Dm) ≤
N∑
i=1
P⊗n0 (Fxm,i),
and the expected value of this error probability (averaged over the generation of {Xm,i}i∈[1:N ]) is bounded from above as
E{Xm,i}
(
P (3)err (m)
)
≤
N∑
i=1
E{Xm,i}
(
P⊗n0 (FXm,i)
)
= er
′√n∑
x
Pn,lX (x)
∑
y
P⊗n0 (y)1
{
log
W⊗nY |X(y|x)
P⊗n0 (y)
> γ
√
n
}
≤ er′
√
n · e−γ
√
n
∑
x
∑
y
Pn,lX (x)W
⊗n
Y |X(y|x)
≤ e−(γ−r′)
√
n.
Thus, the expected value of the average error probability of the third kind satisfies
E
(
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
P (3)err (m)
)
≤ e−(γ−r′)
√
n.
By applying Markov’s inequality, we have
P
(
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
P (3)err (m) ≥ e−(γ−r
′−µ)√n
)
≤ e−µ
√
n.
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That is, with probability at least 1 − e−µ
√
n over the random code selection, the average error probability of the third kind
|M|−1∑m∈M P (3)err (m) ≤ e−(γ−r′−µ)√n, which tends to zero as n tends to infinity since the choice of µ ensures that
γ − r′ > µ.
4) Analysis of covertness: First note that the KL-divergence
D
(
Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0
)
= D
(
Pn,lZ ‖Q⊗n0
)
+ D
(
Q̂nC‖Pn,lZ
)
+
∑
z
(
Q̂nC(z) − Pn,lZ (z)
)
log
Pn,lZ (z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
. (22)
In the following, we upper bound the three terms on the RHS of (22) in Lemmas 4 and 5.
Lemma 4. For sufficiently large n, the KL-divergence
D(Pn,lZ ‖Q⊗n0 ) ≤ δ −
1
3
n−1/3.
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof is essentially due to [27, Lemma 1] and [16, Lemma 8], which analyze the output statistics of
the PPM distribution and state that
D
(
Pn,lZ ‖Q⊗n0
)
≤ l
2
2n
χ2(Q1‖Q0) +O
(
1√
n
)
.
Substituting l = ⌊
√
(2δ − n−1/3)n/χ2(Q1‖Q0)⌋, we complete the proof.
Lemma 5. There exist constant c2, c3 > 0 such that with probability at least 1− exp(−c2
√
n) over the random code design,
the output distribution Q̂nC induced by C ensures
D
(
Q̂nC‖Pn,lZ
)
≤ exp{−c3
√
n}, and
∑
z
(
Q̂n(z) − Pn,lZ (z)
)
log
Pn,lZ (z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
≤ 2n
(
log
1
µ0
)
exp{−c3
√
n/2}.
Proof of Lemma 5. Recall that Q̂nC is the output distribution induced by the set ∪m∈M{Xm,i}i∈[1:N ] with each sequence being
generated i.i.d. according to Pn,lX . We first borrow a result from [32, Eq. (10)] and [16, Eq. (81)] which states that
E
(
D
(
Q̂nC‖Pn,lZ
))
≤ EPn,l
X
W⊗n
Z|X
(
log
(
1 +
W⊗nZ|X(Z|X)
|M|NPn,lZ (Z)
))
. (23)
Let τ , 2tD(Q1‖Q0) and
Bτ ,
{
(x, z) : log(W⊗nZ|X(z|x)/Q⊗n0 (z)) < τ
√
n
}
.
Then, by partitioning (x, z) into (x, z) ∈ Bτ and (x, z) /∈ Bτ , the term in (23) can be expressed as∑
(x,z)∈Bτ
Pn,lX (x)W
⊗n
Z|X(z|x) log
(
1 +
W⊗nZ|X(z|x)
|M|NQ⊗n0 (z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
Pn,lZ (z)
)
+
∑
(x,z)/∈Bτ
Pn,lX (x)W
⊗n
Z|X(z|x) log
(
1 +
W⊗nZ|X(z|x)
|M|NPn,lZ (z)
)
.
(24)
The first term of (24) is bounded from above by
eτ
√
n
|M|N
∑
(x,z)∈Bτ
Pn,lX (x)W
⊗n
Z|X(z|x)
Q⊗n0 (z)
Pn,lZ (z)
≤ e
τ
√
n
|M|N , (25)
and the second term of (24) is bounded from above by
log
1 + 1
(|M|N)min
z:Pn,l
Z
(z)>0 P
n,l
Z (z)
× PPn,l
X
W⊗n
Z|X
(
log
W⊗nZ|X(Z|X)
Q⊗n0 (Z)
≥ τ√n
)
. (26)
Before we state the next lemma, we recall that µ0 = minz:Q0(z)>0Q0(z), µ1 = minz:Q1(z)>0Q1(z), and µ˜ = min{µ0, µ1}.
Lemma 6. We have
log
1 + 1
(|M|N)min
z:Pn,l
Z
(z)>0 P
n,l
Z (z)
 ≤ n log (1 + µ˜) .
11
We defer the proof of Lemma 6 to Appendix A. It then remains to consider the other term in (26).
PPn,l
X
W⊗n
Z|X
(
log
W⊗nZ|X(Z|X)
Q⊗n0 (Z)
≥ τ√n
)
=
∑
x
Pn,lX (x)
∑
z
W⊗nZ|X(z|x)1
{
log
W⊗nZ|X(z|x)
Q⊗n0 (z)
≥ τ√n
}
=
∑
z
W⊗nZ|X(z|x∗)1

n∑
j=1
log
WZ|X(zi|x∗j )
Q0(zj)
≥ τ√n
 (27)
= PQ⊗l1
 l∑
j=1
log
Q1(Z(j−1)w+1)
Q0(Z(j−1)w+1)
≥ τ√n
 , (28)
where (27) is due to symmetry and recall that x∗ is the weight-l vector such that x∗(j−1)w+1 = 1 for j ∈ [1 : l]. By noting that
E(
∑l
j=1 log
Q1(Z(j−1)w+1)
Q0(Z(j−1)w+1)
) = lD(Q1‖Q0) and τ
√
n , 2lD(Q1‖Q0), applying Hoeffding’s inequality yields
PQ⊗l1
 l∑
j=1
log
Q1(Z(j−1)w+1)
Q0(Z(j−1)w+1)
≥ τ√n
 ≤ 2e−c4√n (29)
for some constant c4 > 0. Combining (23), (25), (26), (29), the fact that |M| = exp{er
√
n}, and applying the Markov’s
inequality, we obtain that there exist constants c2, c3 > 0 such that with probability at least 1 − exp(−c2√n) over the code
design,
D
(
Q̂nC‖Pn,lZ
)
≤ exp{−c3
√
n}.
Finally, by Pinsker’s inequality, we know that
V(Q̂n, Pn,lZ ) ≤
√
D(Q̂n‖Pn,lZ ) ≤ exp{−c3
√
n/2},
thus ∑
z
(
Q̂n(z) − Pn,lZ (z)
)
log
Pn,lZ (z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
≤ 2n
(
log
1
µ0
)
· V(Q̂n, Pn,lZ ) ≤ 2n
(
log
1
µ0
)
exp{−c3
√
n/2}.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Combining (22) and Lemmas 4 and 5, we conclude that with probability at least 1− exp(−c2
√
n) over the random code C,
we have
D
(
Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0
)
≤ δ
for sufficiently large n.
D. Code refinements
In the following, we refine a given “weak” covert identification code such that the refined code satisfies the error criteria
and covertness property in Definition 4 and simultaneously retains the rate of the original code.
Lemma 7. Let δ > 0 and ε
(1)
n , ε
(2)
n , ε
(3)
n > 0 be vanishing sequences. Suppose there exists a sequence of codes C (of size |M|)
satisfying
max
m∈M
P (1)err (m) ≤ ε(1)n , max
(m,m′)∈M2:m 6=m′
P (2)err (m,m
′) ≤ ε(2)n ,
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
P (3)err (m) ≤ ε(3)n , D
(
Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0
)
≤ δ.
Then, there exist vanishing sequences ε˜
(1)
n , ε˜
(2)
n , ε˜
(3)
n > 0 (depending on ε
(1)
n , ε
(2)
n , ε
(3)
n ) and another sequence of codes C˜ of
size |M˜| ≥ (1− ε˜(3)n )|M| such that
max
m∈M˜
P (1)err (m) ≤ ε˜(1)n , max
(m,m′)∈M˜2:m 6=m′
P (2)err (m,m
′) ≤ ε˜(2)n ,
max
m∈M˜
P (3)err (m) ≤ ε˜(3)n , D
(
Q̂nC˜‖Q⊗n0
)
≤ δ.
Proof of Lemma 7. We first partition the messages in C into two disjoint sets.
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Definition 5. Consider a code C that satisifes 1|M|
∑
m∈M P
(3)
err (m) ≤ ε(3)n . We say a message m ∈M is a good message if
P
(3)
err (m) ≤ (ε(3)n )1/2, and a bad message otherwise.
Let M˜ ⊂M be the set that contains all the good messages, and M˜c be the set that contains all the bad messages. Without loss
of generality, we assume M˜ = [1 : |M˜|] and M˜c = [|M˜|+ 1 : |M|]. Since the code C satisfies ∑m∈M P (3)err (m) ≤ ε(3)n |M|,
the number of bad messages is at most (ε
(3)
n )1/2|M|, i.e.,
|M˜c| ≤ (ε(3)n )1/2|M| and |M˜| ≥ (1− (ε(3)n )1/2)|M|.
Recall that for each message m ∈ M, the corresponding set of sequences is {xm,i}i∈[1:N ]. We then denote the set of sequences
that correspond to all the bad messages by
B , ∪
m∈M˜c{xm,i}i∈[1:N ],
and note that |B| ≤ N · (ε(3)n )1/2|M|. In the following, we construct a new code C˜ that contains |M˜| messages.
1) We partition the set B into |M˜| equal-sized disjoint subsets B(1),B(2), . . . ,B(|M˜|) such that the cardinality of each subset
(for m ∈ M˜) satisfies
|B(m)| = |B|
|M˜|
≤ N · (ε
(3)
n )1/2|M|
(1− (ε(3)n )1/2)|M|
, νnN, (30)
where νn also tends to 0 as n tends to infinity.
2) For each m ∈ M˜, the corresponding set of sequences in the original code C is {xm,i}i∈[1:N ]. In the new code C˜, we
enlarge this set by appending B(m) to {xm,i}i∈[1:N ]. Thus, the codeword Um is the uniform distribution over a larger set
of sequences {xm,i}i∈[1:N ] ∪ B(m).
3) For each m ∈ M˜, the decoding region of the new code C˜ remains as Dm = ∪i∈[1:N ]Fxm,i . That is, the decoding regions
of the new code C˜ and the original code C are exactly the same.
We now analyze the error probabilities of the new code C˜. For each m ∈ M˜, the error probability of the first kind is bounded
from above as
P (1)err (m) =
∑N
i=1 W
⊗n
Y |X(Dcm|xm,i) +
∑
x∈B(m) W
⊗n
Y |X(Dcm|x)
N + |B(m)|
≤ N
N + |B(m)|
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Dcm|xm,i)
)
+
|B(m)|
N + |B(m)| (31)
≤ ε(1)n + νn, (32)
where (31) holds since W⊗nY |X(Dcm|x) ≤ 1, and (32) is due to (30) and the assumption that the original code satisfies
1
N
∑N
i=1 W
⊗n
Y |X(Dcm|xm,i) ≤ ε
(1)
n . Similarly, for each message pair (m,m′) ∈ M˜2, the error probability of the second kind
P
(2)
err (m,m′) is bounded from above as
P (2)err (m,m
′) =
∑N
i=1W
⊗n
Y |X(Dm|xm′,i) +
∑
x∈B(m′) W
⊗n
Y |X(Dcm|x)
N + |B(m′)|
≤ N
N + |B(m′)|
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(Dcm|xm′,i)
)
+
|B(m′)|
N + |B(m′)|
≤ ε(2)n + νn.
Since all the messages in M˜ are good messages, by Definition 5 we have that for each message m ∈ M˜,
P (3)err (m) ≤ (ε(3)n )1/2.
Finally, note that when constructing C˜, we merely rearrange the sequences of C (rather than expurgate or add any sequences);
thus, the output distribution induced by C˜ is exactly the same as that induced by C, i.e.,
D
(
Q̂nC˜‖Q⊗n0
)
= D
(
Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0
)
≤ δ.
Thus, the covertness constraint is satisfied. Finally, we note that
lim inf
n→∞
log log |M˜|√
n
= lim inf
n→∞
log log |M|√
n
= (1 − η)Cδ,
and the proof is completed by taking η → 0+.
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V. CONVERSE
In this section, we show that any sequence of identification codes with size |M| that simultaneously guarantees that
D(Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0 ) ≤ δ and P (1)err = λ(1)n , P (2)err = λ(2)n , P (3)err = λ(3)n (where limn→∞ λ(1)n = limn→∞ λ(2)n = limn→∞ λ(3)n = 0)
must satisfy
lim sup
n→∞
log log |M|√
n
≤ Cδ.
Lemma 8. Consider any identification code C with message set M, codewords {Um}m∈M, and decoding regions {Dm}m∈M
such that D(Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0 ) ≤ δ. Let fH(m) , 1n
∑
x Um(x)wtH(x) be the fractional Hamming weight for each message m ∈ M.
Then, there exists a constant c5 > 0 such that the average fractional Hamming weight of C satisfies
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
fH(m) ≤
√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
(
1√
n
+
c5
n
)
. (33)
Proof of Lemma 8. We denote the i-th marginal distribution of each codeword Um as (Um)i for i ∈ [1 : n], and the i-marginal
distribution of Q̂nC as (Q̂
n
C)i, which takes the form
(Q̂nC)i(z) =
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
x∈X
(Um)i(x)WZ|X(z|x), ∀z ∈ Z.
Let Q¯C(z) , 1n
∑n
i=1(Q̂
n
C)i(z). By taking the covertness constraint into account and following the analysis in [15, Eqn. (13)],
we have
δ ≥ D
(
Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0
)
≥ nD (Q¯C‖Q0) , (34)
and thus limn→∞D
(
Q¯C‖Q0
)
= 0. By applying Pinsker’s inequality V
(
Q¯C , Q0
) ≤√D (Q¯C‖Q0) /2, we also have
lim
n→∞
V
(
Q¯C, Q0
)
= 0.
Let ψ = ψn ,
1
n
∑n
i=1
1
|M|
∑
m∈M(Um)i(1) be the fraction of 1’s in the codebook, and one can express Q¯C(z) as
Q¯C(z) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
x∈X
(Um)i(x)WZ|X(z|x)
=
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
(Um)i(1)
)
Q1(z) +
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
(Um)i(0)
)
Q0(z)
= ψQ1(z) + (1− ψ)Q0(z).
Note that the requirement on variational distance limn→∞ V
(
Q¯C, Q0
)
= 0 implies that limn→∞ ψ = 0. Furthermore, we know
from [14, Eqn. (11)] that
D
(
Q¯C‖Q0
) ≥ ψ2
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0)−O(ψ3). (35)
Combining (34) and (35), one can bound ψ from above as
ψ ≤
√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
(
1√
n
+
c5
n
)
, (36)
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for some constant c5 > 0. At the same time, one also can interpret ψ as the average fractional Hamming weight of the code,
since
ψ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
(Um)i(1)
=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
xi
(Um)i(xi)1 {xi = 1}
=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
xi
(∑
x(−i)
Um(xi, x
(−i))
)
1 {xi = 1}
=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
x
Um(x)1 {xi = 1}
=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
1
n
∑
x
Um(x)wtH(x)
=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
fH(m), (37)
where x(−i) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn−1. This completes the proof of Lemma 8.
For notational convenience, let
k ,
√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
(
1√
n
+
c5
n
)
.
Lemma 9 (Expurgation Lemma). Suppose there exists a sequence of identification codes C with message set M, codewords
{Um}m∈M, and decoding regions {Dm}m∈M such that D(Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0 ) ≤ δ, P (1)err = λ(1)n , P (2)err = λ(2)n , and P (3)err = λ(3)n , where
limn→∞ λ
(1)
n = limn→∞ λ
(2)
n = limn→∞ λ
(3)
n = 0.
Then, there exist a sequence κn > 0 (which depends on λ
(1)
n , λ
(2)
n ) which satisfies limn→∞ κn = 0 and a sequence of
identification codes C′ with message set M′, codewords {U ′m}m∈M′ , and decoding regions {D′m}m∈M′ such that
1) |M′| ≥ |M|/(n+ 1);
2) For every m ∈ M′, U ′m(x) = 0 for all x such that wtH(x) > (1 + κn)kn;
3) P
(1)
err ≤ (λ(1)n )1/2, P (2)err ≤ (λ(2)n )1/2, and P (3)err ≤ λ(3)n .
Proof of Lemma 9. Since the identification code C satisfies D(Q̂nC‖Q⊗n0 ) ≤ δ, Lemma 8 above ensures that its average fractional
Hamming weight 1|M|
∑
m∈M fH(m) ≤ k. We define G as the subset of messages with small fractional Hamming weight, i.e.,
G ,
{
m ∈M : fH(m) ≤
(
1 +
1
n
)
k
}
. (38)
From (36) and (37), we have
k ≥ ψ = 1|M|
∑
m∈G
fH(m) +
1
|M|
∑
m∈M\G
fH(m) ≥ |M \ G||M|
(
1 +
1
n
)
k,
which further implies that |G| ≥ |M|/(n + 1), i.e., the number of messages with small fractional Hamming weight is not
small. Let λn , max{λ(1)n , λ(2)n } and ǫn ,
√
λn
1−√λn . We partition X
n into two disjoint sets—the low-weight set Xnl , {x ∈
Xn : wtH(x) ≤ (1+ ǫn)
(
1 + 1n
)
kn} and the high-weight set Xnh , Xn \Xnl . In the following, we describe the procedure of
constructing the new code C′.
1) First, the message set of the new code is M′ = G. Thus, fH(m) ≤
(
1 + 1n
)
k for all m ∈M′.
2) For each m ∈ M′, we define gm ,
∑
x∈Xnl Um(x), and we set the codeword U
′
m of the new code C′ to be
U ′m(x) =
{
Um(x)/gm, if x ∈ Xnl ,
0, otherwise.
One can check that
∑
x U
′
m(x) = 1.
3) The decoding regions of the new code C′ are the same as those of C, i.e., D′m = Dm for all m ∈ M′.
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From (38) we have that for each m ∈M′,(
1 +
1
n
)
k ≥ fH(m) = 1
n
∑
x
Um(x)wtH(x)
≥ 1
n
∑
x∈Xnh
Um(x)wtH(x)
≥ 1
n
∑
x∈Xnh
Um(x) · (1 + ǫn)
(
1 +
1
n
)
kn,
which yields a lower bound on gm, i.e.,
gm =
∑
x∈Xnl
Um(x) = 1−
∑
x∈Xnh
Um(x) ≥ ǫn
1 + ǫn
. (39)
We now analyze the error probabilities of the new code C′ which only consists of low-weight sequences. For each m ∈M′,
the error probability of the first kind P
(1)
err (m) can be bounded from above as
P (1)err (m) =
∑
x∈Xnl
U ′m(x)W
⊗n
Y |X(Dm|x)
=
∑
x∈Xnl
Um(x)
gm
W⊗nY |X(Dm|x)
≤ 1
gm
∑
x
Um(x)W
⊗n
Y |X (Dm|x)
≤
(
1 + ǫn
ǫn
)
λ(1)n (40)
≤
(
λ(1)n
)1/2
, (41)
where (40) follows from (39) the the fact that the original code C satisfies ∑x Um(x)W⊗nY |X(Dm|x) ≤ λ(1)n , and (41) is due
to the choice of ǫn. Furthermore, for each message pair (m,m
′) ∈ M′ ×M′ such that m 6= m′, the error probability of the
second kind P
(2)
err (m,m′) can be similarly bounded from above as
P (2)err (m,m
′) =
∑
x∈Xnl
U ′m′(x)W
⊗n
Y |X(Dcm|x)
=
∑
x∈Xnl
Um′(x)
gm′
W⊗nY |X(Dcm|x)
=
1
gm′
∑
x
Um′(x)W
⊗n
Y |X (Dcm|x)
≤
(
1 + ǫn
ǫn
)
λ(2)n
≤
(
λ(2)n
)1/2
.
Finally, we note that the error probability of the third kind P
(3)
err (m) = P
⊗n
0 (D′m) is still bounded from above by λ(3)n ,
since the decoding regions are unchanged, i.e., D′m = Dm for m ∈ M′. We complete the proof of Lemma 9 by setting
κn = (1 + ǫn)
(
1 + 1n
)− 1, which vanishes as n tends to infinity.
Proving the converse of identification problems usually relies on the achievability results for the channel resolvability
problem. In the following, we first introduce the definition of the K-type distributions, and then state a modified version of
the channel resolvability result in Lemma 10. Lemma 10 is modified from the so-called soft-covering lemma presented by
Cuff [33, Corollary VII.2].
Definition 6. For any positive integer K , a probability distribution P ∈ P(X ) is said to be a K-type distribution if
P (x) ∈
{
0,
1
K
,
2
K
, . . . , 1
}
, ∀x ∈ X .
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Lemma 10. Let PX ∈ P(Xn) and PY(y) =
∑
x PX(x)W
⊗n
Y |X(y|x). We randomly sample K i.i.d. sequences x1, . . . ,xK
according to PX. Let
P˜X(x) =
1
K
K∑
i=1
1{x = xi}, ∀x ∈ Xn
be a K-type distribution and P˜Y(y) =
∑
x P˜X(x)W
⊗n
Y |X(y|x) be the corresponding output distribution. Then, for any ζ > 0
and any P ′Y ∈ P(Yn),
E
(
V
(
PY, P˜Y
))
≤ PPXW⊗nY |X
(
log
W⊗nY |X(Y|X)
P ′Y(Y)
> ζ
)
+
1
2
√
eζ
K
,
where the expectation on the left-hand-side of the above inequality is over the random generation of x1, . . . ,xK .
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix B, and is adapted from [33, Section VII-C] with proper modifications.
Note that Lemma 10 above holds for any P ′Y ∈ P(Yn), which differs from an analogous (but more restrictive) result in [33,
Corollary VII.2] wherein P ′Y is set to be PY . This flexibility of choosing P
′
Y arbitrarily is important for proving the converse
because we need to set it to P⊗n0 later for the analysis of the covert identification problem. We now consider the identification
code C′ constructed in Lemma 9.
Lemma 11. Let K , ⌈(1 + n−1/6)2(1 + κn)knD(P1‖P0)⌉. For every message m ∈ M′ with codeword U ′m, there exists a
K-type distribution U˜m such that
V
(
U ′mW
⊗n
Y |X , U˜mW
⊗n
Y |X
)
≤ exp (− c6n1/6)
for some constant c6 > 0, where U
′
mW
⊗n
Y |X and U˜mW
⊗n
Y |X respectively denote the distributions on Yn induced by U ′m and U˜m
through the channel W⊗nY |X .
Proof of Lemma 11. Consider a specific m ∈ M′ with codeword U ′m. Substituting PX with U ′m, P ′Y with P⊗n0 , and setting
ζ , (1 + n−1/6)(1 + κn)knD(P1‖P0) in Lemma 10, we have
PU ′mW
⊗n
Z|X
(
log
W⊗nY |X(Y|X)
P⊗n0 (Y)
> ζ
)
=
∑
x
∑
y
U ′m(x)W
⊗n
Y |X(y|x)1
(
log
W⊗nY |X(y|x)
P⊗n0 (y)
> ζ
)
=
(1+κn)kn∑
q=0
∑
x:wtH(x)=q
U ′m(x)
∑
y
W⊗nY |X(y|x) × 1
(
log
W⊗nY |X(y|x)
P⊗n0 (y)
> ζ
)
(42)
=
(1+κn)kn∑
q=0
∑
x:wtH(x)=q
U ′m(x) PP⊗q1
(
q∑
i=1
log
P1(Yi)
P0(Yi)
> ζ
)
, (43)
where in (42) we partition x into different type classes characterized by their Hamming weights, and (43) is obtained by
assuming xi = 1 for i ∈ [1 : q] and xi = 0 for i ∈ [q + 1 : n] without loss of generality. Also note that
ζ − qD(P1‖P0) ≥ ζ − (1 + κn)knD(P1‖P0) = n−1/6(1 + κn)knD(P1‖P0) , Υ. (44)
Thus, we have
PP⊗q1
(
q∑
i=1
log
P1(Yi)
P0(Yi)
> ζ
)
≤ PP⊗q1
(
q∑
i=1
log
P1(Yi)
P0(Yi)
− qD(P1‖P0) > Υ
)
(45)
≤ exp (− c7n1/6), (46)
where (45) is obtained by subtracting qD(P1‖P0) from both sides and by the inequality in (44), and (46) holds for some
constant c7 > 0 and is obtained by applying Hoeffding’s inequality. Hence, the term in (43) is bounded from above by
exp
(−c7n1/6). Furthermore, one can also show that √eζ/K ≤ exp(−n1/6ζ).
Therefore, by Lemma 10, for every message m ∈M′, there exists a K-type distribution U˜m such that
V
(
U ′mW
⊗n
Y |X , U˜mW
⊗n
Y |X
)
≤ exp (− c7n1/6)+ exp (− n1/6ζ) ≤ exp (− c6n1/6),
for some constant c6 > 0 and all n large enough.
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In the following, we apply standard channel identification converse techniques to the code C′. For any m,m′ ∈ M′ such
that m 6= m′, we have
V
(
U ′mW
⊗n
Y |X , U
′
m′W
⊗n
Y |X
)
≥ U ′mW⊗nY |X(Dm)− U ′m′W⊗nY |X(Dm) ≥ 1− (λ(1)n )1/2 − (λ(2)n )1/2, (47)
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 9 which states that the error probabilities of C′ satisfies P (1)err ≤ (λ(1)n )1/2 and
P
(2)
err ≤ (λ(2)n )1/2. Meanwhile, from Lemma 11 we know that there exists a set of K-type distributions {U˜m}m∈M′ such that
V(U ′mW
⊗n
Y |X , U˜mW
⊗n
Y |X) ≤ exp
(
−c6n1/6
)
, ∀m ∈M′. (48)
Combining (47) and (48), we have the following claim.
Lemma 12. For sufficiently large n, the distributions in {U˜m}m∈M′ are distinct, i.e., there does not exist (m,m′) with m 6= m′
such that U˜m = U˜m′ .
Proof of Lemma 12. Suppose U˜m = U˜m′ for some m 6= m′. By the triangle inequality, we have
V(U ′mW
⊗n
Y |X , U
′
m′W
⊗n
Y |X) ≤ V(U ′mW⊗nY |X , U˜mW⊗nY |X) + V(U˜mW⊗nY |X , U ′m′W⊗nY |X)
= V(U ′mW
⊗n
Y |X , U˜mW
⊗n
Y |X) + V(U˜m′W
⊗n
Y |X , U
′
m′W
⊗n
Y |X)
≤ 2 exp (− c6n1/6),
which contradicts (47) for sufficiently large n.
It is worth noting that the number of distinct K-type distributions on Xn is at most |X |nK . Thus, combining Lemma 11
and Lemma 12, we have
|M′| ≤ |X |nK ,
and by taking iterated logarithms on both sides, we have
log log |M′| ≤ logK + logn+ log log |X |.
Therefore, by recalling that |M′| ≥ |M|/(n+1), K = ⌈(1+n−1/6)2(1+κn)knD(P1‖P0)⌉, and k =
√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
(
1√
n
+ c5n
)
,
we eventually obtain that
lim sup
n→∞
log log |M|√
n
≤ lim sup
n→∞
log log |M′|√
n
≤ lim sup
n→∞
(
logK√
n
+
logn√
n
+
log log |X |√
n
)
=
√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0)D(P1‖P0) = Cδ.
This completes the proof of the converse part.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This work investigates the covert identification problem, showing that an ID message of size exp(exp(Θ(
√
n))) can be
reliably and covertly transmitted over n channel uses. We also characterize the covert identification capacity and show that it
equals the covert capacity in the standard covert communication problem. The covert identification capacity can be achieved
without any shared key.
Finally, we put forth several directions that we believe are fertile avenues for future research.
• Strictly speaking, the converse result established in Section V is commonly known as a weak converse because all
three error probabilities are allowed to vanish as n grows. One would then expect that a strong converse for the covert
identification problem can be shown. This can perhaps be achieved following the lead of [3] and [34, Chapter 6] for the
standard channel identification problem. The key limitation of our converse technique that prevents us from deriving the
strong converse is the use of Lemma 9 (Expurgation Lemma), wherein we expurgate many high-weight sequences such
that the error probabilities of the expurgated code increase significantly. Thus, a promising way to circumvent this issue
might be developing a more general result for channel resolvability with stringent input constraints (i.e., extending the
applicability of Lemma 11), instead of applying the Expurgation Lemma.
• Having established the (first-order) fundamental limits, it is then natural to derive the error exponent of the covert
identification problem. One may follow the lead of the error exponent analysis for the standard identification problem
by Ahlswede and Dueck [2]. However, due to the stringent input constraints mandated by the covertness constraints, this
strategy requires special care and new analytical techniques to obtain closed-form expressions.
• In addition to the KL-divergence metric studied in this work, it is also worth considering alternative covertness metrics
such as the variational distance and the probability of missed detection [16].
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Recall that it is assumed Q1 ≪ Q0, and without loss of generality, we assume there does not exist a symbol z such that
Q1(z) = Q0(z) = 0 . Let Z ′ , {z ∈ Z : Q1(z) = 0, Q0(z) > 0} be the subset of symbols that are impossible to be induced
by the input symbol X = 1. Let I(z) , {j ∈ [1 : n] : zj ∈ Z ′} be the set of locations such that the corresponding elements
belong to Z ′. Note that if z satisfies Pn,lZ (z) > 0, the cardinality of I(z) must satisfy |I(z)| ≤ n − l. For any z such that
Pn,lZ (z) > 0, one can always find an x˜ such that P
n,l
X (x˜) > 0 and I(z) ∩ supp(x˜) = ∅; thus
W⊗nZ|X(z|x˜) =
 ∏
j:x˜j=1
P1(zj)
 ∏
j:x˜j=0
P0(zj)
 ≥ (µ1)l(µ0)n−l ≥ µ˜n, (49)
where µ0 = minz:Q0(z)>0Q0(z), µ1 = minz:Q1(z)>0Q1(z), and µ˜ = min{µ0, µ1}. Then, we have
(|M|N) min
z:Pn,l
Z
(z)>0
Pn,lZ (z) = (|M|N) min
z:Pn,l
Z
(z)>0
∑
x
Pn,lX (x)W
⊗n
Z|X(z|x)
≥ (|M|N)
wl
min
z:Pn,l
Z
(z)>0
∑
x:Pn,l
X
(x)>0
W⊗nZ|X(z|x) (50)
≥ min
z:Pn,l
Z
(z)>0
∑
x:Pn,l
X
(x)>0
W⊗nZ|X(z|x) (51)
≥ µ˜n. (52)
where (51) holds since |M| = exp{er
√
n} and wl = exp{Θ(√n logn)}, and (52) is true since we know from (49) that for
every z such that Pn,lZ (z) > 0, one can find an x˜ with P
n,l
X (x˜) > 0 to ensure∑
x:Pn,l
X
(x)>0
W⊗nZ|X(z|x) ≥W⊗nZ|X(z|x˜) ≥ µ˜n.
Thus, we have
log
1 + 1
(|M|N)min
z:Pn,l
Z
(z)>0 P
n,l
Z (z)
 ≤ log (1 + µ˜n) ≤ log ((1 + µ˜)n) = n log (1 + µ˜) . (53)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 10
Let ζ > 0, and we decompose P˜Y into two sub-distributions P˜
(1)
Y and P˜
(2)
Y such that
P˜
(1)
Y (y) ,
1
K
K∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(y|xi)1
{
log
W⊗nY |X(y|xi)
P ′Y(y)
> ζ
}
,
P˜
(2)
Y (y) ,
1
K
K∑
i=1
W⊗nY |X(y|xi)1
{
log
W⊗nY |X(y|xi)
P ′Y(y)
≤ ζ
}
.
By noting that PY(y) = E(P˜Y(y)), where the expectation is over the random generation of {x1, . . . ,xK}, we have
E
(
V
(
PY, P˜Y
))
=
1
2
E
(∑
y
∣∣∣E(P˜Y(y)) − P˜Y(y)∣∣∣)
≤ 1
2
E
(∑
y
∣∣∣E(P˜ (1)Y (y)) − P˜ (1)Y (y)∣∣∣
)
+
1
2
E
(∑
y
∣∣∣E(P˜ (2)Y (y)) − P˜ (2)Y (y)∣∣∣
)
. (54)
The first term of (54) is bounded from above by∑
y
E
(
P˜
(1)
Y (y)
)
=
1
K
K∑
i=1
∑
y
∑
xi
PX(xi)W
⊗n
Y |X(y|xi)1
{
log
W⊗nY |X(y|xi)
P ′Y(y)
> ζ
}
= PPXW⊗nY |X
(
log
W⊗nY |X(Y|X)
P ′Y(Y)
> ζ
)
.
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By applying Jensen’s inequality, the second term of (54) is bounded from above by
1
2
∑
y
E
(√(
E
(
P˜
(2)
Y (y)
)
− P˜ (2)Y (y)
)2)
≤ 1
2
∑
y
√
E
[(
E
(
P˜
(2)
Y (y)
)
− P˜ (2)Y (y)
)2]
=
1
2
∑
y
√
Var
(
P˜
(2)
Y (y)
)
, (55)
and one can further show that
Var
(
P˜
(2)
Y (y)
)
=
1
K2
K∑
i=1
Var
(
W⊗nY |X(y|Xi)1
{
log
W⊗nY |X(y|Xi)
P ′Y(y)
≤ ζ
})
≤ 1
K2
K∑
i=1
E
(
W⊗nY |X(y|Xi)21
{
log
W⊗nY |X(y|Xi)
P ′Y(y)
≤ ζ
})
≤ 1
K2
K∑
i=1
E
(
W⊗nY |X(y|Xi)eζP ′Y(y)
)
=
eζ
K
P ′Y(y)PY(y).
By using the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality, we see that (55) is further bounded from above as
1
2
∑
y
√
Var
(
P˜
(2)
Y (y)
)
≤ 1
2
∑
y
√
eζ
K
P ′Y(y)PY(y)
≤ 1
2
√
eζ
K
∑
y
P ′Y(y) + PY(y)
2
=
1
2
√
eζ
K
.
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